Nia Deliana - Mehmet Özay 18.07.2024
The victories of Narendra Modi in India and Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia are not only indicative of domestic development priorities. They also reflect a new international behavior that can be interpreted as a reorientation of policy in the face of the urgency of engagement, stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
Questions about government conduct on this issue are not new. Historically, the geography of India and Indonesia on the Indo-Pacific map has been the most strategic, not only in terms of population and economic growth, but also in terms of relations with global powers. The parliamentary majorities formed by the newly elected president in Indonesia and prime minister in India and, lastly, the military capacity, have put these two countries in the limelight.
For all their potential power, the question remains whether Indonesia's newly elected president and India's newly elected prime minister will play an effective role in the global politics of the Indo-Pacific. Will the national leadership achieved by Prabowo Subianto and Narendra Modi transcend a union commitment to the projection of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific?
Mapping of the Indo-Pacific Concept
The Indo-Pacific extends from regions in the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. It precisely encompasses in the tropical land of the Indian Ocean which includes India, Sri Lanka, African nations on the western side of the Indian Ocean and Yemen up the northern side of the Indian Ocean. At the other end, lies central-western part of Pacific Ocean which includes Australia, Japan and South Korea. Between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are all the ASEAN member states and their water zones, as well as the currently disputed South China Sea.
The Indo-Pacific concept emerged at the beginning of this century through strategists' projections. Prioritizing economic cooperation and security between states, the growth spurt accelerated in the second decade. In the 2010s, the effects are being felt by all member countries across the region. It is now common knowledge that the introduction of the Indo-Pacific concept is directly linked to the strategic economic and security strategies of China, which is seeking a global role as a great power.
Under the leadership of the U.S. administration, especially in the face of the U.S.'s multiple disagreements with China, which have noticeably increased after Xi Jinping's presidency in 2013, a new military alliance structure has been introduced in the Indo-Pacific in the last decade, similar to the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical entity. Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and later Japan and India are the states united in a military alliance, as seen in the case of the U.S.-led QUAD and AUKUS, and predominantly determined by the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical worldview that triggered the return of the 'West' to global security expansions from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific outlook.
The fact that India has re-entered the security and military demographic definition of the Asia-Pacific has indicated a renewal of historical alliance structures. Similarly, Indonesia, with its vast archipelagic geography, occupies a dominant place in global geopolitics and geo-economics between the two reefs, towards the Anglo-Saxon entities on one side and China's economic appeal on the other. Both countries are inescapably important to the global powers.
Despite two different approaches to alliance with global powers, there are more elements that unite than divide. In terms of international politics, India and Indonesia were united members of the Non-Aligned Movement, seeking an alternative for progress in industrialization and development. Both countries sought an informal alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), especially when India was under Congress Party governments that sought global cooperation with the USSR. As likely as Indonesia approached towards the USSR looking from the interplay of Soekarno at the international arena. This is not the case of allying with Russia instead of China or the U.S., but the decision-making process has been through a self-determined oriented foreign affairs that come without reliance or dictation by military alliance or interference by other great powers.
The electoral victories in India and Indonesia have once again raised the question of whether the countries' fate in the growing Indo-Pacific rivalry is destined to be a historical repetition, or whether both countries will intensify their economic and military engagement in the Indo-Pacific by aligning themselves with one of the power orbits.
The Strategic Reefs of India and Indonesia
So what is the position of India and Indonesia in the emerging security and economic imagination of the Indo-Pacific? To answer this question, one must recognize the existing reefs that serve the natural rationale and strategy that guide directions in both countries' foreign relations approach within the great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.
India is strong but also fragile. This means that the basic social and political infrastructures of the country, which include very diverse societies divided by ethnicity, religion, caste and ideology, demand equal human rights and distribution of wealth within the political framework of the nation-state. Ideally, the hurdles to securing these demands could mean that the Indian central government could be prevented from becoming a strong actor in the international arena. This situation goes beyond the Hindu majority-Muslim minority dichotomy. It leads the country's political elite to give priority to improving their position in domestic decision-making.
Given its inward-looking domestic politics, this does not mean that India has sidelined proactive engagement in international politics. The trigger for engagement is based solely on a realist approach, where it sees its nation's security at stake. It was triggered by several cases. A long-standing border dispute with China in the Himalayan region is one example. Another is the maritime infrastructure projects that China is developing in connection with the Maritime Silk Road project from the west to the east of the Indian Ocean, i.e. from Myanmar to Djibouti, as well as the Pakistan-China border infrastructure at the Khunjerab Pass and the Gwadar-Kashgar crude oil pipelines, which are seen as having the potential to serve as a decisive pattern organ that would allow the weakening of India's influence as a regional power.
Despite these signals, Narendra Modi's response has been a barking tree. For example, in the recent open battle between China and India in the Himalayas, in which 20 Indian soldiers died, there were hardly any strong decisions taken by India, which was under the so-called strong leadership of Narendra Modi and a government dominated by Hindutva, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). On the other hand, there is another concern surrounding the recent statement made by the Indian authorities. The competition between India and China for minerals in the Indian Ocean, such as cobalt, which is now being eyed by China and Sri Lanka, has led India to claim that the Indian Ocean is the 'Indian Sea', which requires official confirmation of territorial sovereignty due to China's denial. Looking at the two examples above, it is quite early to say that India has failed to portray itself as a content regional power, especially in the rising global rivalry in Indo-Pacific affairs.
The natural strategic reef that Indonesia is facing is similarly displayed through the disputes in the oceans involving the South China Sea, Natuna Island, economic ventures with China, and military strengthening partnership with the U.S. Although Prabowo Subianto will officially hold the seat of the presidency in November 2024, numerous media outlets and critics highlight his realist and constructivist approach, equipped with a strategy to gain a position in international politics, as a higher priority compared to that of his predecessor, who focused heavily on achieving domestic goals rather than international recognition. In the last two months alone, his visits to Malaysia, Singapore and the meeting with the US Secretary of State in Jordan have given the impression of his commitment to active participation in international affairs.
His realism and constructivist approach in considering international engagement comes from his military background as Defence Minister during Joko Widodo's second term (2019-2024), his entire career in the army and war experience since the Soeharto era, his entry into national politics four times as a presidential candidate, and his role as spokesman of certain opposition circles in the country speak volumes about what Indonesia would serve to international states and communities. The dispute over China's nine-dash line claim played a role in the victory of Prabowo, who was known as an efficient and responsive actor during China's possible encroachment on Indonesia's Natuna Islands. Prabowo, who was then Defence Minister, initiated an important military construction in Riau Province that provides an eagle view of the military engagement that could result from the South China Sea dispute.
However, as much as Prabowo may be a realist and constructivist, good economic relations with China and the U.S. in recent decades would prevent any lone ranger from strategizing a move. Like India, Indonesia would probably seek to balance and hedge its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, forcing the Prabowo administration to first strengthen and leverage cooperation with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the United Nations before aligning with any of the Indo-Pacific power blocs.
https://politicstoday.org/india-and-indonesia-security-orbits-in-the-indo-pacific/
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